Revue économique 65-3, mai 2014

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTORAL LAW OF 29 JUNE 1820
In this article we use the theory of power indices to evaluate the respective influence of the two classes of electors in the polling method introduced by the electoral law of 29 June 1820, known as the law of "double vote". We show in a simplified framework that the voting power of the "major" electors, who vote twice, is at least three to five times as much as the voting power of the “minor” voters, who vote only once.

GEOGRAPHY OF THE DEAD OF WWI IN FRANCE
This article uses the new database « Mémoire des Hommes » (MdH) and the 1911 survey. To analyze the geographic spread of dead of the Great War, we have assessed the potential of mobilizable by areas and tested an econometric model which includes demographic, economic and spatial variables to identify the factors influencing the number of dead. If demographic factors are the main determinants, economic variables combined with geographic and spatial variables correctly explain the spread of the number of dead by areas.

DIFFERENT REGIONS, UNEQUAL CASUALTIES?
SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF FIRST WORLD WAR DEATHS AND ITS PROBLEMS
This paper discusses the statistical analysis of French soldiers' death during the Great War, on a methodological, empirical and historiographical level. It shows that such a research derives from a specific context in which wartime regional identities have attracted a growing interest among scholars and the general public. It emphasizes the convincing results of this geographical study, namely, the fact that no regions appear to have suffered excessive casualties with regard to their social and economic characteristics. Finally, some further lines of enquiry, among which the possibility of collective research projects focusing on the wealth of numerised sources, are discussed.

STRICT FISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY:
THE CASE OF SOCIAL VAT
This paper studies the local dynamic properties of a simple general equilibrium model with Social vat. Strict balanced budget rules often lead to real indeterminacy of aggregate equilibrium, leaving room for « sunspots » fluctuations. In a closed economy setup, social vat escapes this property and only reduces the aggregate labor supply elasticity. However, the quantitative effects are weak.

MORAL SELF-LICENSING OR HOW “GOOD DEEDS” MIGHT LEAD TO UNDESIRABLE SITUATIONS.
Recent research argues that a good deed can disinhibit individuals and lead them to achieve undesirable deeds (e.g., choosing a salad which leads to increased snack intake). This so-called licensing effect has been recently documented in several analyzes, but we still lack a stabilized analytical framework. We also mention several contributions in behavioral economics that can explain licensing effects by alternative rationales. We aim at defining and characterizing the licensing effect and instead, emphasize plausible circumstances under which it can lead to unexpected adverse effects. We use examples from several domains such as food consumption or prosocial behaviors. Several policy implications are developed. We identify several research extensions to better understand this licensing effect. We also indicate strategies that can be used to overcome this bias.

THE IMPACT OF PIRACY ON PHYSICAL PURCHASES AND PAY-DOWNLOADS: A COMPARISON OF FOUR CULTURAL INDUSTRIES.
Using a survey on cultural habits and consumption behavior of 2,000 individuals, we study the determinants of physical purchases and pay-downloads in four cultural industries: books, recorded music, movies, and video games. We show that the impact of piracy on legal purchases differs among these industries: it is negative for recorded music, but positive for video games. This impact also differs among individuals, when we distinguish occasional pirates from intensive ones. Our results suggest that piracy and pay-downloads are complements rather than substitutes for recorded music, video games and books.

DEFENSE SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN A NONLINEAR CONTEXT: THE CASE OF FRANCE
The aim of this article is to propose further empirical evidence on the defense spending – economic growth relationship in the case of France. Given the complexity of this nexus, we use a nonlinear model, which is original for the case of France. The results are the following: (i) a nonlinear approach is better compared to a linear approach; (ii) the transition variable is the lagged growth rate; (iii) the asymmetric behaviour of defense burden is highlighted depending to the growth regime: in the cases of low growth and high growth, the effect is negative but turns to be positive for intermediate growth rates.

SCHOOL CHOICE IN FRANCE:
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AFFELNET PROCEDURE
In this paper, using matching theory, we analyze the assignment procedure of students to high schools used in France: the Affelnet procedure. We show that this procedure is equivalent to the deferred-acceptance procedure where schools propose, defined by Gale and Shapley [1962]. We deduce that a certain number of properties are fulfilled by the Affelnet procedure. Specifically, it is stable and hard to manipulate. However, it has two major drawbacks: first, among all stable procedures, it is the one yielding the worst assignment from the view point of students. Second, the Affelnet procedure does not respect priorities: if a student gets a higher priority at all schools (for instance, by improving his grades), he may get a final assignment which makes him worse off. We also discuss two additional elements of the Affelnet procedure: the constraint on the number of schools that parents are allowed to rank, as well as, the existence of a bonus for schools ranked first in the preference list. Finally, we point out the existence of an alternative procedure, the deferred-acceptance procedure where students propose which does respect priorities and is the most efficient among all stable procedures. We run simulations to assess the impact of the adoption of this procedure on students' welfare. We relate the efficiency gains to specific characteristics of students’ preferences.