Revue économique 65-2, mars 2014

JEREMY BENTHAM AND THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF LEGAL RULES: THEE CASE OF MONETARY RULES.
Marco Guidi, Nathalie Sigot
This article aims at showing how Bentham addressed the modern issue of the economic efficiency of the law (as defined by Posner); to do that, we focus on Defence of Usury [1787] and the manuscript Sur les prix [1801a]: in 1787, Bentham stated that, in order to increase wealth, the rate of interest should be freely determined by the market; in 1801, he called for a system of controlling the money supply growth. The relationship between market and rules is thus fundamental; with usury laws, rules are intended to replace market, although market is more efficient and opens many possibilities of circumvention (I), while Bentham plead for a complementary relationship between rules and market, in the case of his proposals for controlling the money supply (II).

ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS. LESSONS FROM THE COASE THEOREM
Steven G. Medema
The Coase theorem occupies an important place in the history of modern economics. Its implication that institutions are irrelevant for economic performance, though, posed great difficulties for economists, both in their treatment of the theorem per se and in their attempts to grapple with the effects of property rights and transaction costs –two key features of the institutional underpinnings of the economy. This article explores how the Coase theorem and its treatment by economists point to the importance of institutions and the tensions within modern economics that were revealed by these efforts.

CASS SUNSTEIN'S BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES ON LAW: DEBIASING AND LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM
Samuel Ferey, Bruno Deffains
Behavioral approach is nowadays one most prominent field within law and economics literature. Applying bias and heuristics to the law draws new insights and mechanisms on the role and functions of law in society. By studying Sunstein's works on this topic, we argue that two different normative views emerge from behavioural analysis: debiasing and libertarian paternalism. We show these two conceptions of the law are not necessarily opposed: they rely on a broad conception of freedom as "cognitive freedom".

THE INSTITUTION OF FAMILY: A NEW REASON FOR SEPARATION BETWEEN COMMONS AND VEBLEN
Philippe Broda
This paper deals with Commons’s and Veblen’s position on the specific institution of family. Commons adheres to the conventional pattern in which men are in charge of the livelihood and woman of the affective side. He admits the inequality between men and women. The historical evolution let simply expect the development of relationships based more on persuasion than on coercion. Veblen, for his part, backs feminism. According to him, women must become emancipated and work outside the home. Keeping them within the household enables men to establish a domination mainly expressed through "conspicuous" consumption and “vicarious” leisure.

PROPERTY RIGHT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN SAINT-SIMONIAN ANALYSIS
Gilles Jacoud
From 1825 to 1832 the Saint-Simonians advocated an evolution of the economic and social order which resulted from their analysis of property right and its effects on the functioning of a society in which the property owners exploit the labourers. Improving the lot of labourers and economic progress require measures which make it possible to lower the revenues of idle owners, to ensure a better allocation of capital to the labourers and to alter the conditions of access to ownership. Setting up a banking system combining centralization and specialization enables lowering the interest rate, reducing the exploitation of the labourers and fostering economic activity. A reform of inheritance law can also put an end to social reproduction.

SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN TOCQUEVILLE AND LE PLAY: “NOBLESSE OBLIGE”
Shirine Sabéran
This article examines the principle of a social responsibility of the industrial class, as it was envisaged by Tocqueville and Le Play in the 19th century: both considered that the disappearance of the institutions of the Ancien Régime, as well as industrial growth resulted in a loss of traditional values and a rise of new ones, focused on the sole satisfaction of private material interests. To moralize this new society, they put forward the analysis of institutions that would modify the mores of the ruling class and then, by diffusion, those of the whole society: this is the aim of Tocqueville’s aristocratic association and Le Play’s “patronage.”

CAPITALISTS AND LEGISLATORS: ABOUT ADAM SMITH’S SYSTEM OF NATURAL LIBERTY
Daniel Diatkine
This paper shows that exists a continuity between the Mercantile System (Smith’s adversary) and the System of Natural Liberty advocated for in the Wealth of Nations. This continuity is founded on the distance between legislators and merchants. When this distance is too short, legislators are partial for they confuse merchant’s interest with general interest. When this distance is too long, the consequence may be anarchy and civil war. So between the two it exists an optimal distance which may characterize the System of Natural Liberty, which is necessary for impartial legislators.